Language:
Home Core Serverless Edition CDS — Constitutional Screening
gateSport — VAR Engine gateMotorsport — Stewarding Engine gateAntiDoping gateTransfer
gateSocialMediaLaws gateMusicCompliance gateClinicalTrials gateRealEstateTransactions gateAgriFoodCompliance gateHeavyIndustry gateEnergyGridCompliance
gateBankingCompliance gateCBDC gateHFT gateConsortiumLoans gateTaxExecution
gateLogistics gateIntralogistics gateRailLogistics gateAviationLaws
gateEsgSocial gateSustainabilityCompliance
gateGovernmentActs gateProcurement gateBundID
Pipeline Gate 0 STFL Enforced Edge Grid CRPG Cybersecurity Data Sources System Documentation
Pricing Due Diligence Machine Law — The Book Institutions Jurisdictions Press FAQ
Quantum Security Defence 🏰 🔍 Search Request Access →
← Back to Cybersecurity
// QUANTUM SECURITY · DEEPER TECHNICAL VIEW

Two algorithms, two completely different threats.

Quantum computing is not a single threat, it is two separate algorithms with fundamentally different effects, against fundamentally different cryptography. This page goes deeper than the general cybersecurity overview and shows exactly which algorithm affects which part of our architecture, and which does not.

// Fundamentals

What structurally makes a quantum computer different.

A classical bit is either 0 or 1. A qubit can hold both states at once, a superposition, and multiple qubits can be entangled so that the state of one depends on the other. This lets certain algorithms search a vast solution space in parallel instead of sequentially.

01
Superposition
A qubit represents a probability distribution over 0 and 1 at once, not a fixed value.
02
Entanglement
The state of multiple qubits can be correlated, measuring one instantly changes the probability of the other.
03
Error correction as the bottleneck
Qubits are noise-prone. A cryptographically relevant quantum computer needs thousands of error-corrected, not merely physical, qubits, that is why today's machines are not yet sufficient.
// The two algorithms

Shor breaks structure. Grover speeds up search.

This distinction is the core of the entire defence logic, so it comes first, before the architecture itself is explained.

STRUCTURAL BREAK
Shor's Algorithm (1994)
Efficiently solves factoring large numbers and discrete logarithms, exactly the two mathematical problems RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography rest on. A sufficiently large, error-corrected quantum computer would not weaken these methods, it would structurally dissolve them.
AFFECTS: RSA, ECDSA, ECC
ACCELERATED SEARCH
Grover's Algorithm (1996)
Speeds up search in an unsorted database quadratically. Against symmetric methods like HMAC-SHA256, that means effective security is halved, from 256 to effectively 128 bits. That is a weakening, not a structural break, and 128 bits remains a practically unreachable number of operations.
AFFECTS: HMAC-SHA256, SHA-256
// Our own architecture

Why a receipt stays valid, even if an attacker owns a quantum computer.

A quantum computer attacks the classical signature and the symmetric chain integrity in two completely different ways. The post-quantum signature is untouched by either attack. A receipt only fails once all relevant layers fail simultaneously, not when a single one is weakened.

Quantum-Sicherheitsarchitektur: Shor gegen klassische Signatur, Grover gegen symmetrische Kettenintegrität, Post-Quantum-Signatur bleibt unberührt

Concept illustration, not a proof of unbreakability

// Timeline context

What is real, what is speculation, what is regulatory.

TODAY
Largest known quantum processors, around 150 to 160 qubits
Far from the error-corrected qubit count needed to break RSA-2048. Isolated reports of alleged quantum attacks on RSA in fact involved tiny test numbers using a different technology, not real RSA keys.
2024
NIST finalises FIPS 203, 204, 205
ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA are finalised after an eight-year public selection process.
2030
NSA reference deadline, not our own
The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 sets 2030 as the migration deadline for US National Security Systems.
// Clarification

What this page does not claim.

  • No claim that a break of the lattice-based methods is excluded. ML-KEM and ML-DSA have been final since August 2024, younger than RSA and ECC, the hybrid combination is therefore the more cautious choice, not a superfluous one.
  • No claim that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists today. The architecture is designed against harvest-now-decrypt-later, a risk already running independent of today's state of the machine.
  • Not a replacement for the general cybersecurity overview. This page deepens only the cryptographic part, it does not replace access control, network security, or organisational diligence.

Questions about the cryptographic architecture?

access@immoquick.eu
Request Access →